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This thesis examines the broad issues and concepts which impact the effectiveness of U.S.
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study to gain visibility on the number of elements involved in deployable communications and
their interrelationships. Previous studies were reviewed to determine where trends existed, and
contemporary analysis efforts were examined for clarity and cohesiveness. The principles of
command and control are discussed, followed by a description of the current family of U.S. Air
Force deployable communications equipment and how it supports the warfighters in the deployed
environment. Central issues and concepts are developed through trade-off analysis and illustrative
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design, strategic/tactical interface, and interoperability. Conclusions indicate that persistent
systems integration problems are more the result of organizational and conceptual problems than
with the physical technologies. Recommendations include the establishment of a "center of
excellence" to coordinate and facilitate systems integration. The tools for such a center include
clear policy direction, computer models and simulations, trade-off analysis, and artificial
intelligence/expert systems. A conceptual architecture is provided to illustrate the desired
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The motivation for this thesis stems from years of frustration on the part of the
author to gain an insight into how to "integrate" deployable communications systems.
Integrate is set off in quotes because the word can mean many things to many people.
In this context, it will be taken to parallel the ideas from systems theory, which states:
• The whole is more than the sum of parts,
• The whole determines the nature of the parts,
• The parts cannot be understood if considered in isolation from the whole, and
• The parts are dynamically interrelated and interdependent. [Ref. l:p. 10]
This means that communications support is more than just a set of wires between
two points. Integration concepts should encompass not only the technical aspects of
communications, but also the management and organizational structures which ultimately
enable the wires to exist
Pre-thesis research indicated that the above concept was still not very prevalent
among those who are charged with the responsibility to manage deployable systems. This
is somewhat understandable given the nature of the task. Communications systems
themselves are complex. They are the single common denominator throughout a theater;
every functional area is affected by communications. This makes the gaining of
consensus among users challenging due to differing opinions of priorities and
requirements. Further, while the management mechanism used to eventually field a
system seems to have structure in theory, the execution is frequently considered
fragmented in actual operation.
As such, there are two separate threads that run through this thesis: the fundamental
issues relating to the physical process of providing communications, and the
organizational issues which impact the Air Force's ability to put those physical systems
in place. They are distinct, yet intertwined, and systems theory maintains both must be
understood if the "whole" of deployable communications is to be understood.
B. TERMS
Many terms have come to be associated with communications over the years.
Command and control, or C2 , is frequently joined with communications to form C3 .
Later, computers and intelligence were added to C3 to form C*I. All terms are used in
this paper primarily due to the thrust of the source documents. While the terms are not
exactly interchangeable, the frequent use of C3 and 0*1 in documents illustrates the
interdependence of elements. This thesis will consider communications as the bridge
between where information is processed (computers and intelligence) and where it is used
to make decisions (command and control).
C. SCOPE
Tackling a project such as this forced the focus to remain at a fairly high level.
Any single issue could lend itself to in-depth analysis. But the challenge is not one of
solving individual problems, it is one of integrating all of those solutions into a larger,
workable whole. In our case, it is the communications supporting the warflghter in a
deployed environment. To stay manageable, the scope was generally limited to Air Force
systems, with the understanding that the Air Force systems are themselves part of a
larger, joint system.
D. OVERVIEW BY CHAPTER
Chapter II is a review of three previous studies of deployable communications. The
objectives, findings, and recommendations of the studies are discussed and summarized.
Chapter IE provides a snapshot of the joint and USAF views of architectures. The
development flows from high level guidance from the joint staff through to the directives
which stipulate the Air Force deployable communications architecture.
Chapter IV describes deployable systems at present. This includes a detailed
description of the tactical air control system (TACS), and the communications equipment
which supports the TACS and the tactical air base. Shortfalls and trends highlighted from
Operation Desert Storm are discussed briefly.
Chapter V explores the central issues and concepts which must be addressed in
developing a deployable communications architecture. The emphasis is on understanding
the interrelationships between the issues to facilitate and stimulate informed decisions
regarding the potential shape of future systems. Policy, type of conflict to plan for,
phasing of equipment arrival, modularity, and distributed processing are key issues.
Chapter VI provides a summary of the research and recommendations to enhance
systems integration of deployable communications for the future.
II. REVIEW OF STUDIES
Three studies were reviewed to provide a foundation for the balance of this research. While
they differed somewhat in their approach and assumptions, they were remarkably consistent in
their findings and recommendations.
A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The studies reviewed were completed between 1985 and 1991, and all were sponsored by the
Air Force Systems Command (AFSC).
1. Twenty-First Century Tactical Command and Control (TC 2-21)
This study was conducted in 1985 by a group of industry and DoD personnel. Their
intention was to "...develop an architectural framework for tactical command and control (C2) for
the early twenty-first century period. ..to guide development of a survivable and sustainable
tactical C2 capability...", all against a NATO backdrop. Important assumptions were:
• Basic USAF mission and doctrine (as stated in Air Force Manual 1-1) would not change
• Basic tactical C2 functions do not change, although the execution and environment could
• The threat and C2 structure from the NATO central region provided the baseline of
consideration to establish maximum requirements of performance
• The likelihood of worldwide contingency deployments established the need for modularity,
flexibility, and transportability [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]
2. Tactical Battle Management (TBM)
This study, along with the U.S. Air Force Tactical Communications study, was
conducted by the Air Force Studies Board (AFSB). The TBM study was completed in 1986, but
the report was not published until 1990 due to changing priorities (as a result of a changing
world political climate). Scope was limited to conventional tactical air missions for Europe and
Southwest Asia. Their task was as follows:
• Examine the operational requirements, independent of the present or likely capability to
satisfy those needs
• Survey and project the technology relevant to decision- aiding information technology
• Match the capabilities to the needs
• Review the current programs and acquisition process
• Recommend ways to facilitate the development of effective TBM aids and related
technology [Ref. 3:p. 1]
What this amounts to is to find out where the Air Force can apply decision aids to
assist in TBM, and then determine how to put those tools in place.
3. U.S. Air Force Tactical Communications
Completed in 1991, this study was an extension of the earlier TBM study. While the
TBM study recognized communications as an important element in TBM, the panel was not
chartered or structured to examine it in detail. This study focused specifically on tactical
communications support to battle management. By agreement with the sponsor, scope was
limited to reviewing the USAF's ability to meet the needs of its contingency forces. Their task
was:
• Evaluate planned tactical communications capabilities, with particular emphasis on joint-
service and multi-national interoperability
• Examine the technological command and control requirements
• Recommend future concepts for application
• Propose an implementation strategy [Ref. 4:p. 5]
B. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1. TC2-21
This study determined that physical dispersal and functional distribution would be key
to survivability for deployed systems. Figure 1 helps to illustrate this point. From a topology
standpoint, the greater the separation between elements, the greater the difficultly in locating and
targeting them. For functional distribution, their idea was to provide redundancy through
spreading the functions throughout the theater versus concentrating them in focused elements.
In this way, if one part of the network is disabled, another part can assume its workload. This
helps eliminate single points of failure. In addition, to take full advantage of technology, manual
methods of battle management must give way to using automated decision-support capabilities.
Finally, the need for rapid deployment will drive a "building-block", modular C2 approach for
transportability and for allowing incremental levels of capability as required. [Ref. 2:p. ii]
2. Tactical Battle Management (TBM)
The TBM study found that current technology would meet the USAF's needs, but must
be integrated into the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to be effective. This is being
accomplished through programs such as the Modular Tactical Air Control Center (MTACC), the
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Figure 1: Architectural Options [Ref. 2:p. Ill- 19]
Contingency TACS Automated Planning System (CTAPS), and the Modular Control Element
(MCE). However, they stated the current development and acquisition system does not get this
new technology into the field fast enough to meet the Air Force's needs for TBM. It takes too
long, and items are frequently outdated by the time they are fielded. It was pointed out that an
acquisition system which works well for weapon systems does not provide the flexibility needed
when technologies are rapidly evolving. Finally, the lack of coordinated effort to field essential
systems has severely impacted the Air Force's ability to manage tactical air warfare. [Ref. 3:pp.
3-4]
3. U.S. Air Force Tactical Communications
This study highlighted discrepancies in the areas of testing, architecture and engineering.
They found that communications systems were not stressed during testing in a way that would
be typical of a warlike environment. This may be at least partially related to the next point of
there being a lack of knowledge regarding the network loading demands which might be
experienced under warlike conditions. Without this information, it is difficult to realistically
stress a network during testing or exercises. Finally, they noted there is a lack of adequate
systems architecture and systems engineering. According to the report:
Planning, development, and management of the tactical communications system has been
and is fragmented and dispersed among several organizations. The Air Force must
establish a structure for TBM, including the supporting communications, so that the
developing technologies and the evolving command, control, communications, and
intelligence capabilities 'fit' into and contribute to the overall system. [Ref. 4:p. 8]
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study recommendations fell into two broad categories: those that related to the
management of the systems (development, acquisition, and implementation) and those that were
concerned with the technical means of providing deployed command and control.
1. Management Issues
The number one issue from all studies was that a tactical C2 or battle management
architect must be designated and given clear responsibility and authority to accomplish the task
of systems integration. It was noted that the process of design and implementation of systems was
fragmented among many different offices, and no single agency was responsible for oversight and
integration of the various efforts [Ref. 2:p. IV- 1, Ref. 3:p. 4, Ref. 4:p. 13]. The TBM study
along with the TC2-21 were critical of the development, acquisition, and testing arenas. TBM
suggests a better interaction between the users and developers since requirements tend to be
dynamic and difficult to state in detail. Rapid prototyping and field testing (what they call "build
a little, test a little") will ultimately be the key to successful development [Ref. 3:p. 4]. TC2-21
pointed out the need for a comprehensive test bed. At the time of its writing, equipment and
expertise were spread across the country. Little if any networking existed to tie these sites
together [Ref. 2:p IV-3]. While the National Test Bed (NTB) concept seeks to tie research,
development and operations sites together through a distributed network, it is unclear if TC2-21
was a motivating factor. The USAFTC study further suggested rapid prototyping and field
testing as part of the evolutionary acquisition approach [Ref. 4:p. 14]. Table 1 summarizes these
and the following recommendations.
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2. Technical Issues
While not a specific recommendation except from the TC2-21 study, all reports noted
that simply using many of the equipments and concepts already available in the private sector
will provide the ability to field smaller, lighter, and more modular equipment. The USAFTC
study points out that much of our current equipment is based on 1960's technology [Ref. 4:p. 9].
Advances in electronics and packaging (large scale integration of components) since that time
have yielded large reductions in size and weight. Finally, the USAFTC states the tactical C 3
system must remain robust under operational stress and continue to fulfill its essential missions.
To do this requires knowledge of the missions, expected degradations under stress and enemy
countermeasures, and loading of the supporting communications network. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS TC2-21 TBM TC
1. Integrate planning & C2 architectures XX XX XX
2. Greater flexibility and user interface in develop-
ment, acquisition, and testing XX XX XX
3. Comprehensive testing XX XX
4. Develop smaller, lighter, more modular
equipment
XX
5. Robust network under stress XX
D. SUMMARY
The studies reviewed all made the point of needing to designate a systems architect and
engineer, and to vest in them the authority to integrate the many aspects of systems design as it
11
is currently performed. Rapid prototyping and field testing, and greater use of commercially




This chapter is an overview of the joint and Air Force concepts and architectures
which are currently guiding the planning and implementation of deployable systems.
A. C4I FOR THE WARRIOR
C*I for the Warrior (referred to in this section as simply C*I) is a concept paper
developed by the Joint Staff/J-6 office [Ref. 5]. It provides a high level view of what is
expected for the warrior and how to transition current systems toward that goal.
1. Concept and Goal
The idea behind C*I is to take a top-down approach to integrating technology
into deployable systems, versus the usual bottom-up approach which can introduce new
technology quickly but tends to fragment its implementation. The result of the bottom-up
approach has been the fielding of a great deal of helpful equipment, but much of it
operates in a stand-alone mode, overloading the warfighter with too much information that
is uncorrected between sources. This is unacceptable in a era of increasing emphasis on
joint operations. The ultimate goal of C*I is to provide "...a fused, real time, ground truth
picture of [the warrior's] battle space and the ability to order, respond and coordinate
horizontally and vertically to the degree necessary to prosecute his mission in that battle
space." While many elements must work together to make this happen, the focus in this
document was only on equipment, not on procedures or doctrine. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
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2. The Road Map
While many architectures provide a view of systems on the horizon that will
be all things to all users, C*I argues that none will provide the needed interoperability
today. What is needed is an affordable way to make the current systems interoperate to
give our warfighters the needed edge. With an ideal of being able to pull from the ether
whatever the warfighter needs, C*I states that standardizing our information exchange will
enable us to gain the needed interoperability and provide the required "picture" for the
warrior.
The single, overriding fact is that interoperable systems must exchange information .
The foundation needed for interoperability is formed by defining the criteria to
exchange information. THE STANDARD that is needed is a very straight forward
definition of the communications protocol and data format required to input and
extract information from the 'data base in the ether.' [Ref. 5:pp. 5-6]
There are a number of advantages to making existing systems interoperable
through information exchange. The primary reason is that the cost becomes reasonable—
instead of entirely new systems, only interfaces need to be built to allow existing systems
to talk. In addition, existing systems are already performing the missions assigned and
commanders are comfortable with them. What is needed is to enhance their "picture"
through greater access to a more extensive data base. The point is made that for
survivability reasons, the "data base in the ether" should not be a single data base, but
rather a distributed data base. Service architectures would fit under this concept simply
by meeting the communications protocols and data formats established within the data
base. [Ref. 5:p. 6]
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C*I accepts that getting "from here to there" will still be a long, costly
process, but insists that the goals must be set today and adhered to, or else they will never
be achieved. The focus will be on concepts such as open systems architecture, pull of
information (from the data base) versus pushing everything into a commander and letting
him sort it out, data standards, fusion of intelligence, and tools such as expert systems and
artificial intelligence to enable construction of the ultimate architecture. [Ref. 5:p. 6]
3. Moving Toward the Goal
C*I outlined three areas that will provide the means to realize the goal of
interoperablity between existing systems and the long range architecture: standards, use
of resources, and testing.
a. Standards
An instrumental factor in defining standards has been the establishment
of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) (and the Joint Interoperability
Engineering Organization (JIEO) within DISA) as the single focal point within DoD for
standards. Getting this concept institutionalized will require all of the CINCs and services
to use the DISA standards. In addition, the standards must be kept as simple as possible.
The example of 60 cycle, 115 volt household electricity is used as an analogy. The
rationale is that keeping the standards simple will keep program costs down. [Ref. 5:p.
7]
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b. Use of Existing Resources
A suggested starting point for an interoperability program would be to
examine the existing data formats currently in use, as well as those that industry can
offer. Studying the current information set may allow correlation of some elements into
an ultimately smaller and more clearly defined set of data elements. The desire is to keep
that set as small as possible. Some standards may be able to be used as is, while others
might need slight or even complete modification. Once the standard is defined, the issue
of compliance comes up. Compliance will be the responsibility of the system owners,
and will be verified through testing. [Ref. 5:pp. 7-8]
c. Testing
Just as a focal point has been appointed for standards, the Joint
Interoperability Test Center (JTTC) at Fort Huachuca, AZ will be the focal point for
interoperability testing. The recommendation is to make testing an early priority in
program life. Eventually, the JITC will have a distributed test capability which will no
longer require the equipment to be physically located at their premises. Testing will be
possible through "dial-in" connectivity aimed at making compliance easier and earlier in
program development. [Ref. 5:p. 8]
B. JOINT INTEROPERABILITY ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION
ARCHITECTURES
The Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization (JIEO) serves as the DoD
systems engineer for C4 information systems. In this capacity, they look primarily at
16
interoperability issues between forces supporting the deployed CINCs. They look at
architectures from three standpoints: long-range objective, CINC interoperability, and
functional interoperability. [Ref. 6]
The long-range objective architecture program reviews the current and long-range
service architectures for potential duplication or interoperability problems. JIEO hosted
an objective architecture conference in September 1991 where the services briefed their
conceptual architectures and discussed potential interoperability problems. [Ref. 6]
The CINC interoperability program reviews the C* requirements of the CINC, and
identifies the elements that will provide C4 support. These elements could be U.S. forces,
Federal agencies, or allied/coalition forces. Assessments of C4 capabilities are made,
deficiencies identified, solutions recommended, and a detailed implementation plan
developed. [Ref. 6]
The functional interoperability program focuses on specific mission areas and is not
limited in scope to a specific CINC. Again, an assessment of current capabilities is made,
deficiencies identified, solutions recommended, and an implementation plan developed.
[Ref. 6]
Because the products developed are generally classified, no diagrams are included
in this paper. In addition, many of the documents are under revision in an attempt to
standardize the information provided. Eventually, these documents will serve as the
design model for C4 systems in the joint environment. [Ref. 6]
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C. AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS-COMPUTER SYSTEMS
ARCHITECTURE
Guidance for the Air Force Communications-Computer Systems (C-CS) Architecture
is contained in Air Force Pamphlet 700-50, Volume I. It ensures that:
...validated communications-computer systems requirements are satisfied with
integrated, affordable solutions. [An architecture's) purpose is to provide standards,
systems, protocols, interfaces, and so forth, that must be considered when
developing, implementing, or modifying Air Force communications-computer
systems. |Ref. 7:p. 3]
The intent of the architecture is to keep "today's innovative solution" from
becoming tomorrow's integration nightmare.
1. Background
The need for an architecture is driven by the number of systems introduced
by the various communities (whether functional area, base- or command-level, or Air
Force wide, or those supporting weapons systems) to meet unique needs. Without a plan,
all compete for the same limited resources of dollars, cable plant, and space, and with
little regard toward interoperation with other systems. [Ref. 7:p. 3]
This situation occurred as an outgrowth of the rapid expansion of technology
over the last 20 years. As users have become more literate in the new technologies, they,
in turn, developed new applications to automate and enhance their operations. Finally,
as products became available, requirements tended to be written in terms of hardware
desired, not a capability. Frequently, the technical community was not consulted for ways
to satisfy the requirement. |Ref. 7:p. 3|
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The 700-series regulations outline a process and family of documents to
provide the guidance needed to pull all of the elements together. They move from the
more abstract "vision" outlined in the Planning and Architectural Guidance (a ten year
planning horizon) to the defined roadmaps that will provide the goal architecture, and
finally the programming and implementation phases which work in shorter horizons and
more concrete terms. [Ref. 7:pp. 4-5]
2. Architectural Development Fundamentals
There are certain goals, attributes, key concepts, and common processes which
must span all C-CS efforts. Goals provide the common direction for all levels as systems
are reviewed for improvement. The goals of the Air Force C-CS architecture, and the
more specific objectives which support them are shown in Tables 2 and 3. [Ref. 7:p. 8]
a. Attributes
An architecture must have influence if it is to affect the long-term C 3 I
infrastructure. It must also provide a structure to guide the entire life cycle of a program
and its equipment. The focus must be on wartime requirements, and it must specify
systems which will meet military requirements even in an era of fiscal contraction. [Ref.
7:p. 8]
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TABLE 2: AF C-CS ARCHITECTURAL GOALS [Ref. 7:p. 8]
GOALS
/ . Ensure mission essential needs for communications-computer systems are supported.
2. Exploit information as a resource to enhance mission effectiveness and efficiency in both wartime and peacetime
.
3. Ensure mission-essential communication-computer systems are as functionally survivable and enduring in stressed
environments as the forces supported.
4. Ensure communications-computer systems which process sensitive information provide an adequate level of information
protection.
5. Exploit technology to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of communications-computer systems to meet Air Force
wartime and peacetime mission requirements.
TABLE 3: AF C-CS ARCHITECTURAL OBJECTIVES [Ref. 7:p. 8]
OBJECTIVES
1. Focus the efforts of communications-computer systems organizations to provide better end-user support.
2. Enhance communications-computer systems support to end-users to increase mission effectiveness or permit reduction in
resource requirements.
3. Provide end users with powerful, flexible, integrated tools to improve responsiveness.
4. Enhance user friendliness of communications-computer systems to reduce training requirements associated with their use.
5 Provide modern, machine-independent software engineering tools to expedite development of major systems.
6. Increase portability through "open systems."
b. Key Concepts
(1) Understanding the User Requirement. Understanding the user
requirements (what they call "user information needs") entails information flows, possible
stress points, and the impact of environmental dynamics. Requirements should be stated
in terms of mission needs, and not in terms of specific hardware or technologies. [Ref.
7:p. 8]
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(2) Interoperability. Since data frequently moves from one system
to another, systems must be interoperable and compatible with each other at the boundary.
As more systems are interconnected, the technical architecture should guide system design
to ensure interoperability at the time of implementation. [Ref. 7:p. 9]
(3) Open Systems. Open systems allow equipment from many
different manufacturers to co-exist and interoperate. With renewed emphasis on fully
competitive contract awards, the C-CS environment will have even greater vendor
diversity in the future. The layered approach in open systems, which specifies where
certain technical functions are performed, provides the ground rules any new system must
meet [Ref. 7:p. 9]
(4) Distributed Processing. The idea here is to move the information
as little as possible and keep it as close as possible to the user to meet their needs. The
pamphlet suggests a robust, shared network of interconnections to facilitate distributed
processing and standards to define information exchange to minimize data conversions.
[Ref. 7:p. 9]
c. Common Processes
All architectures, regardless of nature or scope, are to follow the same
basic development process. The steps are as follows:
1. Describe the baseline architecture,
2. Identify system requirements,
3. Identify key factors that affect the architecture,
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4. Develop a target architecture,
5. Define an evolutionary path, and
6. Develop acquisition and implementation strategies to reach the target. [Ref. 7:p.9]
3. Target Architecture
The target architecture is shown in Figure 2, and is expected to employ
concepts stated earlier in a "system of systems which will be robustly interconnected to
responsively serve all users." The target does not carry a specific time for implementation,
but most of the features are expected to be in place by the year 2010. [Ref. 7:p. 1 1] The
target will use the concepts of open systems, multi-level security, and centralized
communications with distributed processing. Data and software are to be standardized
to enable the sharing of resources (such as data elements) and reduce duplication of effort.
[Ref. 7:p. 14] The interplay between the "building blocks" used in the development of
the architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
Each building block is also a "technical architecture" documented in additional
volumes of AFP 700-50. Because many of the technical architectures/building blocks
appear in the architecture of interest (deployable systems) it is helpful to briefly explain
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Figure 3: Architectural Building Blocks [Ref. 7:p, 12]
a. Deployable Communications-Computer Systems
Deployable systems support a wide range of users through switching
equipment, transmission media, and access to common-user systems in a deployed
environment. They provide both intra- and inter-theater connectivity through either local
or long-haul information transfer. [Ref. 7:p. 11]
b. Data Management
Data management sets up the standards which allow different
applications programs running on different hardware the ability to share data as a
corporate resource. [Ref. 7:p. 11]
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c. Local Information Transfer
Local information transfer is the movement of voice, data, video, and
other services within a base environment. [Ref. 7:p. 11]
d. Long-Haul Information Transfer
Long-haul systems provide connectivity to the common-user systems
managed by DISA, and dedicated command and control systems which reside outside the
intrabase environment. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
e. Integrated Systems Control
Integrated systems control provides the equipment and procedures to
monitor and troubleshoot network facilities as needed. It serves as a technical control
point for fault isolation and detection at base level. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
/. Software
Future software acquisition and development will be based upon
commercial products already available, Ada (the DoD standard language), and standard
databases, tools, and supporting languages. Configuration control will continue to be a
priority. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
g. Security
The objective of security is to protect information from either physical
or electronic compromise. Technical and procedural measures are employed to
accomplish this task. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
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h. Automated Support Systems
This area includes the dedicated and shared-use computer systems in the
base environment, with a focus on standard systems. Computers can be those acquired
from standard requirements contracts or from other sources. An example of the current
automated support systems is shown in Figure 4. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
The above concepts all support the overall Air Force C-CS architecture.
Deployable systems naturally use many of the same building blocks to develop the sub-































* WIMS: Work Information Management System
(Civil Engineering minicomputer Implemented
on WANG VS- 100)
* COOF: Comptroller Office ol the Future
(Accounting/Finance support system
implemented on UNISYS Sys $200)
* APDS II: Automated Personnel Data System
Implemented on IBM Minicomputer
Figure 4: Automated Support Systems [Ref. 7:p.l3]
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D. AIR FORCE DEPLOYABLE C-CS ARCHITECTURE
The Air Force Deployable C-CS Architecture (DCSA), as stated in AFP 700-50,
Volume II, provides the technical structure to realize the target architecture and defines
an evolutionary path to follow. The document parallels the steps outiined in Section
EQ.C2.C in providing background, the current baseline, the target, and an evolutionary
strategy. The background is similar to that presented earlier, so will not be repeated.
1. Current Baseline
The current baseline of equipment is as depicted in Figure 5. The equipment
provides the supporting infrastructure for control of combat air forces, airlift assets, and
the main operating bases (MOB's). [Ref. 8:p. 10] The present deployable systems are
covered in greater detail in Chapter IV.
2. Target Architecture
The target architecture is designed to overcome shortfalls in the areas of
voice, data, and transmission systems through an integrated, digital, common-user,
distributed network. Commercially available technologies and standards, coupled with
open systems will be used to the maximum extent possible. Components should be the
same as their fixed-station counterparts, or re-packaged (but not re-designed) to meet
unique military requirements. [Ref. 8:p. 28] The target architecture is centered around
an Information Transfer Node (ITN). The ITN serves to route information packets and
performs network functions. Concepts presented during Chapter II are also included, i.e.,
















Figure 5: Current Deployable C-CS Architecture [Ref. 7:p. 12]
building block" for intrabase communications. Each topology will be tailored to the
specific needs of the attached users. [Ref. 8:p. 37] Groups of users are further
interconnected across the deployed base through a communications backbone as shown
in Figure 7. This allows users to transfer information throughout the MOB, and to reach
long-haul lines not homed off of their ITN. [Ref. 8:p. 38] Finally, Figure 8 depicts many
MOB's interconnected. This provides connectivity throughout the theater, and into the









Figure 6: Information Transfer Node [Ref. 8:p. 38]
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Figure 7: Interconnected ITN's forming a MOB [Ref. 8:p. 39]
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Figure 8: Theater-wide Connectivity [Ref 8:p„ 43]
3. Evolutionary Path
The evolutionary path in AFP 700-50 Vol. Q is a restatement of previous
ideas: using an evolutionary approach to integrating commercially available standards,
technologies, and concepts into the DCS A. The rationale is simple: fiscal constraints
will not allow the fielding of an entirely new family of equipment. Interfacing existing
systems to new systems (or among non-interoperable current systems) will be both a
priority and challenge. [Ref. 8:p. 46]
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E. SUMMARY
The consensus from the high level joint guidance through the Air Force technical
architecture is that deployable systems must be able to support the warfighter. Since
solutions are needed now, and money is hard to come by, interfaces will play a major role
in this evolution. The long range objective is to incorporate as much off-the-shelf
equipment and technology into the deployed environment as possible. This should ensure
interoperability among users within the theater, and between the fixed environment and
deployed systems.
31
IV. DEPLOYABLE SYSTEMS AT PRESENT
This chapter provides an overview of the deployable equipment presently in use,
and introduces some of the challenges presented to those systems during Operation Desert
Storm. The Tactical Air Control System (TAGS) and combat communications provide the
bulk of what is generally considered deployable or tactical communications. Although
their missions are different, much of their supporting communications infrastructure is the
same.
A. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM
The TACS is, as its name states, a system. A number of components serve to pull
the entire air picture together. In broad terms, the TACS has two primary missions:
control and monitor the movements of tactical aircraft, and provide the means for request
and control of tactical air support (also known as close air or ground support). Figure 9
shows the overall TACS [Ref. 9:p. 32]. The TACS uses the principle of centralized
control and decentralized execution in both structure and operation. Its focal point is the
Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).
History has shown the absolute necessity for centralized control and decentralized
execution in tactical air operations. A TACC is the hub of that activity. A TACC
is the operational facility in which the Air Component Commander (ACC) plans,
directs, and controls tactical resources. The TACC enables the ACC and his senior
staff to supervise the activities of assigned or attached forces and to monitor the






Figure 9: The Tactical Air Control System [Ref. 9:p. 32]
1. The Tactical Air Control Center
The functions of the TACC are: force employment, flight management, battle
management, and systems management. Force employment is the result of the Air
Tasking Order (ATO)—the translation of the ACC's guidance and strategy into
coordinated and detailed execution orders. Flight management monitors the progress of
assigned missions. Battle management is control of actions taken in direct response to
those of enemy forces, while systems management ensures the smooth flow of C2
information between the various elements of the TACS. [Ref. 10:p. 11
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In the joint arena, the TACC is the C2 system that supports the Air Force
Component Commander/Commander Air Force Forces (AFCC/COMAFFOR) for airspace
management. It is dedicated to and operationally responsive to him for airspace control,
air support coordination and control, and air strike coordination and control.
Decentralized execution of air missions (the ATO) by subordinate elements of the TACS
promotes mission effectiveness and enhances responsiveness. [Ref. 1 1 :p. 4-24]
The combat plans division of the TACC develops the ATO based upon mission
objectives, availability of forces, and the tactical situation. It tasks units to accomplish
specific missions in support of the commander's objectives, and contains enough detail
to enable the air crews and TACS elements to accomplish those missions. [Ref. 10:p. 2]
The combat operations division then provides centralized control, monitoring, and
supervision of the decentralized execution of the ATO. Flexibility is built in to allow
adjustment to the ATO should the tactical situation dictate. [Ref. 10:p. 4]
2. Tactical Control, Monitoring, and Coordination
The TACS uses a tiered approach to assist the TACC in its tasks of
controlling, monitoring, and coordinating tactical aircraft (and then reporting their
movements). The subordinate elements to the TACC are the control and reporting centers
(CRC's), the control and reporting posts (CRP's), the forward air control posts (FACP's),
the message processing center (MPC), and the airborne warning and control elements.
[Ref. 9:p. 32]
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a. Control and Reporting Center
The CRC is directly subordinate to the TACC and is the primary element
concerned with decentralized execution of air defense and air space control operations.
The CRC gets its tasking and receives weapons allocations from the TACC. Sensor or
radar information comes to it from ground-based sources (such as the CRP's and FACP's)
as well as airborne elements. [Ref. ll:p. 4-24]
Within its area of responsibility, the CRC directs the region or sector air
defense and provides aircraft control and monitoring for both offensive and defensive
missions. It relays, as directed, mission changes to aircraft and coordinates control of
missions with subordinate TACS elements and other agencies. In addition, it has the
following responsibilities:
Supervise subordinate radar elements
Provide threat warning for friendly aircraft
Ensure air defense assets of all services are employed in mutually supporting roles
Coordinate procedures based upon friendly artillery fire plans
Establish the means for air traffic regulation and identification
Support air rescue operations [Ref. 12:p. 4]
b. Control and Reporting Post
The CRP is subordinate to the CRC and provides radar surveillance and
aircraft control within an assigned sector. It has similar capabilities to the CRC and can
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assume CRC functions when directed. One or more CRP's may be employed depending
upon area size, terrain, and anticipated level of threat. [Ref. ll:p. 4-24]
c. Forward Air Control Post
The FACP is the mobile radar element subordinate to the CRC or CRP.
It is normally deployed into forward areas to extend radar coverage and to provide control
of air operations, early warning surveillance, and gap filler service. Because of its
mobility and compact design, the FACP can be quickly moved to maintain a desirable
location for a changing tactical situation. During initial or contingency operations, a
FACP may be the only ground radar available, and would report directly to the TACC.
[Ref. 12:p. 5]
d. Message Processing Center
The MPC supports the TACC, CRC's, and CRP's, acting as the interface
control unit for the TACS. It is the primary element of the TACS that provides for the
automatic exchange of data with other services and air defense systems. It uses the
tactical data link (TADIL) to "talk" to other services, and provides the capability to
translate from one TADIL format to another. This last feature enhances overall service
interoperability since at least two formats are currendy in use between the three military
departments. [Ref. ll:p. 4-26]
e. Airborne Warning and Control
The airborne warning and control system (AWACS) provides an airborne
radar platform coupled with a C2 capability. This enables it to perform the function of
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a CRC or CRP, or to provide enroute C2 during a tactical deployment. The basic mission
responsibilities include surveillance, warning, control, and battle management. The
AWACS can detect initial hostile air action and provide its radar picture to ground and
naval units via the TADIL. In addition, the AWACS can monitor surface vessels and
provide the capability to monitor enemy naval activity, and deny them the advantage of
conducting covert operations in an area where no surface radar exists. The AWACS can
also provide information on friendly ground forces through the use of transponders. [Ref.
12:p. 9]
The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft
is not shown as part of the TACS in Figure 9 because it is still under development, but
it provides a look-down radar to capture the area beyond the forward line of troops
(FLOT). It has a moving target indicator (MTI) which will detect vehicles in either a
broad or focused mode, and a synthetic aperture radar which can provide terrain mapping
or coverage for fixed targets. [Ref. 13:p. 53]
3. Tactical Air Support and Control
The elements that assist the TACC in its task of tactical air support and control
functions are the air support operations center (ASOC), tactical air control parties
(TACP's), forward air controllers (FAC's), the wing operations center (WOC), and the
airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). [Ref. 9:p. 32]
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a. Air Support Operations Center
The ASOC is collocated with the senior Army tactical operations center.
The ASOC plans, coordinates, and directs immediate tactical air support of ground forces.
It is subordinate to the TACC, and provides fast reaction for immediate requests for close
air support, tactical air reconnaissance, and in some situations, tactical airlift, [Ref. 12:p.
6]
b. Tactical Air Control Parties
TACP's are subordinate to the ASOC and are located at each appropriate
command echelon of the supported ground force, normally battalion through corps. They
assist the commander through the request and coordination of preplanned and immediate
tactical air support. [Ref. 12:p. 7]
c. Forward Air Control
The FAC's and Airborne-FAC's (A-FAC's) are subordinate to the
TACP's and primarily dedicated to direct support of friendly ground forces. They provide
the detailed coordination and control of close air support that integrates air-delivered
firepower with friendly ground force fire. Although the FAC's primary missions are
controlling attacks, requesting air support, and providing immediate battle damage
assessment, the A-FAC also performs air surveillance and search and rescue operations
as needed. [Ref. 12:p. 7]
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d. Wing Operations Center
The WOC is subordinate to the TACC and serves as the airwing
commander's headquarters. He uses the WOC, with its facilities and staff, to manage and
control sortie generation by his wing. [Ref. 9:p. 35]
e. Airborne Command and Control Center
The ABCCC provides flexibility and control for tactical air missions and
ensures the ATO is implemented. It normally serves as an extension of the combat
operations division of the TACC or as an airborne ASOC. The facility is a self-contained
module carried aboard a specially modified C-130 aircraft (a number of external antennas
are mounted to accommodate the C2 radios). The ABCCC can handle only procedural
control; it cannot perform radar coverage. Radar coverage is provided by the AWACS.
[Ref. 12:p. 8]
B. COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS
Where the TACS has a mission defined in terms of command and control, combat
communication's mission is to provide the last "C" in C3 to facilitate C2 in the deployed
environment. In essence, combat communications provides the backbone or infrastructure
which will link the locations together within a theater, and even across theaters as needed
[Ref. 14]. Figure 10 shows an overview of a deployed tactical communications network
including the TACS and combat communications equipment. The elements within the









































Figure 10: Deployable Tactical Communications [Ref. 15:p. 22]
40
Combat communications provides the backbone from the Air Force Component
Headquarters (AFCH) to the tactical air bases (TAB's) and into the Defense
Communications System (DCS). Where the TACS relies upon mission-unique equipment
(radars and display scopes, for example) for its C2 mission, it uses much of the same
equipment as combat communications for its links between sites. These links, as shown
in Figure 10, are usually provided by the joint tactical communications (TRI-TAC) and
ground mobile forces satellite communications (GMFSC) equipment
C. TRI-TAC
TRI-TAC is the acronym given to the joint tactical communications program and
the equipment procured under it. The program evolved out of interoperability problems
experienced by U.S. forces during the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts. In the early 1960's,
the U.S. participated in an allied research effort with Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom called Mallard. The intent was to develop an allied communications capability
based upon evolving digital technologies. In 1969, the Congress mandated that the U.S.
pull out of the Mallard effort to focus upon U.S. joint-service interoperability. Even
though Mallard never provided any hardware, it did generate a great deal of technical
information which would serve as the foundation for TRI-TAC. [Ref. 16:p. 15]
DoD Directive 5148, May 1971 created the TRI-TAC program and office. This
program was intended to create a new family of multi-service, interoperable, digital-
switched equipment that was totally compatible across the family and with existing
equipment. To do this, common equipment items were divided among the services, who
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acted as the single development and procurement agent for that item. The major
objectives of the TRI-TAC program according to the DoD charter were:
• Achieve the necessary degree of interoperability among tactical communications
systems and other DoD telecommunications systems
• Place in the field in a timely manner new tactical communications equipment
required by the armed forces to perform their mission and which reflected the most
effective technology
• Eliminate duplication, where feasible, in the development of service equipment, and
• Perform the above in the most economical manner
The TRI-TAC office, specifically the director, was tasked to act as the systems
architect and principal planner for the TRI-TAC system. [Ref. 16:p. 16]
The equipment procured can be divided into six general categories: user terminals,
switching facilities, control element, transmission facilities, multiplexers, and modems.
By the late 1980's most of the major equipment had been fielded, and many pieces have
evolved through internal equipment and software updates. Table 4 provides the description
and nomenclature of the major pieces of TRI-TAC equipment by category. The multiplex
and modem equipment is frequently referred to as digital group multiplex (DGM)
equipment. The AN/TSQ-146 Multiplex Van is not a separate piece of multiplex
equipment, but rather an assemblage of DGM equipment into a larger van that provides
a patching and testing capability.
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TABLE 4: TRI-TAC EQUIPMENT [Adapted from Ref. 16:p. 20]
TYPE DESCRIPTION NOMENCLATURE
User Terminals Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal










Switching Facilities 750 Line Nodal Circuit Switch
150 Line Unit Level Circuit Switch
30 Line Unit Level Circuit Switch
50 Line Store and Forward
Message Switch






Control Element Communications Nodal Control
Element
AN/TSQ-111
Transmission Facilities Troposcatter Radio Set
Line-of-Sight Radio Terminal Set
Line-of-Sight Radio Repeater
Tropo-satellite Support Radio


















Cable Driver Modems Group Modem
Low Speed Cable Driver Modem
High Speed Cable Driver Modem
Remote Loop Group Multiplexer
Cable Driver Modem
Low Speed Pulse Restorer








A word about equipment packaging is in order here. Terminals, multiplexers, and
modems are usually man-portable devices, ranging in size from a desk telephone to a
desktop personal computer, and less that 40 pounds. Switching, control, and transmission
facilities are usually integrated into their own shelters which require the use of
mobilization equipment and trucks to move them. The Air Force uses the S-280 and S-
250 shelters for this equipment. The S-280 is about 7' x 7' x 14' and can weigh up to
10,000 pounds when fully configured. The AN/TTC-39, AN/TTC-42, AN/TYC-39,
AN/TSQ-111, and one version of the AN/TRC-170 use the S-280 shelter. The S-250
shelter is sized to fit in the bed of a standard pick-up truck, and can weight up to 6,000
pounds when fully configured. The trucks that carry this shelter are modified to handle
the extra weight. A smaller version of the AN/TRC-170 uses the S-250 shelter.
D. GROUND MOBILE FORCES SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
The ground mobile forces satellite communications (GMFSC) terminals are not
formally part of the TRI-TAC program, but are complementary since TRI-TAC does not
include any satellite communications equipment. The Air Force uses two GMFSC
terminals, the AN/TSC-94A and the AN/TSC-100A. Both use super-high frequency
(SHF) radios, but the 100A is a larger, multi-carrier frequency version with greater built-
in redundancy. The lOOA's are frequently used as "hub" stations, with the 94A's acting
as "spokes" and extending the network. Two antennas are available for use, the standard
8-foot dish or the higher gain 20-foot dish. The GMFSC terminals use the same shelters
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as does TRI-TAC. The AN/TSC-100A is housed in an S-280 shelter, and the AN/TSC-
94A uses the S-250.
Figures 1 1 to 14 show representative connectivity diagrams for how the TRI-TAC
and GMFSC equipments are used to support the tactical air base (TAB) and air force
component headquarters (AFCH) in the near- and far-term.
E. SHORTFALLS AND TRENDS FROM DESERT STORM
The conflict in the Middle East affords an opportunity to study how deployable
systems worked under operational use, as well as a chance to view the larger management
processes that occur above the theater level. While not exhaustive, four areas are listed
below.
1. Phasing of Equipment Arrival
With an initial emphasis on getting a deterrent presence in theater, the
communications equipment needed to eventually manage that presence was considered
a low priority for use of airlift assets. Only after discussions among senior officers to
alert commanders that they would not be able to control their forces without the
supporting communications equipment did the priorities move up. But it was still several
weeks before the larger pieces of equipment arrived. Although the Time Phased Force
Deployment List (TPFDL) is intended to iron out these details in advance, allocation of
airlift assets was conducted on an ad hoc basis and was complicated by the non-modular,




























































































































































Figure 13: AFCH Current (1991) |Ref. 15:p. 27]
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Figure 14: AFCH Target (1996-1999) [Ref. 15:p. 291
49
2. Strategic/Tactical Interface
This area has been, and continues to be, a problem when deployed
communications equipment attempts to interface with fixed systems such as the DCS
[Ref. 16:p. 28]. This stems from the different environments each system operates within,
and the standards and test procedures each accordingly employs. In fact, of the 24 trunks
between the U.S. and the Middle East, 18 did not work properly until 21 Dec 90~four
months after intended activation. [Ref. 18]
3. Satellite Communication Dependence
The network established for Desert Storm relied greatly upon satellite
communication (SATCOM) for its success. This medium provided the capability to grow
and reconfigure under dynamic conditions which the network architects desired. [Ref.
19:p. 42] SATCOM was the only feasible way to distribute the network over the vast
theater of operations and provide the connections back into the DCS. Terrestrial
communications were used to extend the network further from "spoke" sites and served
to provide the critical redundancy between sites already connected via SATCOM. [Ref.
19:p. 43]
4. Paradigm Shift in Operations
The current command structure for air operations places most of the command
and control functions physically on the ground. However, during Desert Storm, the roles
reversed and much of the C2 of air operations took place in the air. The primary
platforms involved were the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the
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Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC), the Joint Surveillance and Targeting
Attack System (Joint STARS), and Rivet Joint (a signals intelligence aircraft). This is a
significant departure from the historical command and control role for aircraft as primarily
sensors. [Ref. 20] This evolution in operations could be shifting the Air Force toward a
new de facto C2 architecture which could provide unparalleled capability, but will also
force designers to deal with growing complexities and associated issues.
F. SUMMARY
The Tactical Air Control System and combat communications comprise the majority
of what the Air Force calls tactical communications. Both systems use the TRI-TAC and
GMFSC equipment to provide the communications links needed in the deployed
environment: TACS for the airspace management and control missions, and combat
communications for theater connectivity. Desert Storm presented challenges to deployable
systems from both a technical and conceptual standpoint. Not only was the actual
equipment put to the test, but the entire process of providing command and control has
been opened up for examination.
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V. CENTRAL ISSUES AND CONCEPTS
This chapter is not intended to "solve" the problems currently facing communication
systems planners, but is an attempt to lay out a selection of variables for consideration
so as to help "define" the problem. Due to the interdependence of the variables, a
systems approach was considered appropriate as an analysis method. Every attempt was
made not to reduce a very complex problem into simple, toy-problem terms, but more
into chunks that illustrate the interdependence of the elements.
A. DEFINITION OF C2
At the core of any military communications issue should be the reason that
communication is needed: to facilitate and support command and control (C2) of the
forces and means of war. JCS Publication 1-02 provides a good starting point for C2
from which to build upon.
1. JCS Pub 1-02 Definition of C 2
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment
of the mission. [Ref. 21:p. 77]
Perfect C2 implies some level of omnipotence on the part of the commander,
the ability to have all the desired information available to make a decision at the time of
the commander's choosing (what he needs to know when he needs to know it).
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2. C 2 is Information Centered
Information, as opposed to raw data, is what allows a commander to make
decisions that will favorably affect the outcome of war. Paul Stares said in his book
Command Performance :
The contribution of command and control to military effectiveness derives from the
use of its basic commodity-information. With accurate information, uncertainty
about the surrounding environment can be reduced and decisions affecting the
readiness, movement, and application of military force can be taken with a clearer
understanding of the likely costs and benefits. If processed and delivered promptly,
information can also provide more time for these decisions to be taken and,
moreover, implemented with successful results. [Ref. 22 :p. 19]
Decisions made without the benefit of information are at best lucky, and at
worst disastrous. As Stares points out, to be of any value, this information must possess
at least two qualities: timeliness and accuracy.
3. Timeliness and Accuracy
Perfect information should, by implication, possess both timeliness and
accuracy. In reality, perfect information is not available to the commander. In general,
accuracy and timeliness are proportional, where highly accurate information can take a
very long time to prepare and confirm. Under dynamic conditions, this situation would
not prove helpful. As such, a balance between the two qualities is desirable. Some
amount of accuracy is traded off to allow the information to get to the commander in time
to be of value. Determining how "good" is "good enough" and trying to quantify the
trade off between timeliness and accuracy is beyond the scope of this effort. However,
assignment of a confidence level to information is one way to provide an indication of
how sure the source is about the accuracy of the information.
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There is an economic concept called the "Law of Diminishing Marginal
Returns" where, as additional resources are used, the incremental increase in output
declines with higher levels of resource usage. Beyond some point, there is zero or
negative marginal return for resources used in the production an output. Using the above
case as an example, it may be possible to attain a 90% confidence for accuracy of
information within 1 hour, but to improve the confidence an additional 5-9 percentage
points (to 95-99%) may require an additional 4 hours. Figure 15 illustrates this point in
graphic form.
Figure 15: Confidence in Information Curve
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The shape of the curve is due to the underlying technologies and processes
which are used to obtain and confirm the information. A relatively fast sensor may
indicate the occurrence of an event within a class of events, while different sources may
be consulted to further narrow the event. All of this confirmation takes time, especially
where manual intervention is needed. For many applications, the 90% confidence may
be sufficient to base decisions upon. Policy, sensitivity of decisions, and commander's
experience will likely shape the thresholds used in practice.
What this information allows a commander to do is outperform the opponent
in real-time under dynamic conditions. Colonel John Boyd illustrated this concept well
in what is called the "O-O-D-A" loop.
4. Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop
Colonel Boyd, a former USAF pilot and aerial combat theorist, developed this
model originally for maneuver warfare. It is used here to simplify and illustrate the C2
process. According to James Fallows:
This 'loop' consists of cycles of observing (O) the enemy's actions, orienting (O)
oneself to the unfolding situation, deciding (D) on a counter, and then acting (A).
The principle is that the side which can complete these cycles more quickly will
ultimately prevail .... [Ref. 23:p. 19]
As seen in Figure 16, Boyd's model does not show the adversary's O-O-D-A
loop and the environment that contains both. Dr. Joel Lawson and Prof. Paul Moose
extended and adapted Boyd's model to include the adversary's loop in the overall
environment, as seen in Figure 17 [Ref. 24:p. 187]. Although different terms are used,






Figure 16: Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop
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Figure 17: Lawson's C Model
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The balance of this chapter is concerned with the issues and concepts that
form the basis for designing architectures and systems. Just as the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force (CSAF) asked his staff: "...how would we set up comms for a Desert Storm
like operation if we were free to do it the way we want, starting from a clean sheet of
paper?" we can also build from the ground up. [Ref. 15:p. 31]
B. POLICY AND ASSUMPTIONS
We cannot truly start with a blank sheet of paper. The role of policy is to provide
the planning guidance needed to shape and narrow the feasible alternatives. Viewed in
terms of operations analysis, policy helps define the objective function and constraints
used to obtain an optimal solution to a problem. For example, the problem might state:
Minimize: Cost
Subject To: Capability > X
Airlift Requirements < Y
Personnel Requirements < Z
Or the problem could be of the form:
Maximize: Capability
Subject To: Cost < S
Airlift Requirements < Y
Personnel Requirements < Z
The above illustrates different ways to state the problem. The bottom line is to
provide an acceptable level of capability for a specified number of dollars. (It should be
noted that the problem as stated may or may not have a feasible solution). The difficulty
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arises in trying to write a model which will allow an analytical solution. Many variables
will of necessity be constrained, i.e., money that can be allotted or current airlift available.
However, by holding the other values constant and letting the variable of interest run
unconstrained, the model can return a value that will satisfy the constraints as written.
While the chosen level of capability may require three times the gross national product
or more airlift than currently exists in the world, this can still be used as a planning tool
for model refinement or to examine the underlying technologies with greater scrutiny.
Given that previous studies and guidance are leading towards smaller, lighter, more
modular equipment, and greater interoperability between services and the commercial
sector, what issues and approaches will shape an integrated transition into the next
century? Due to the complexity of C2 systems (organizationally, technically, or the
human element involved) it may never be possible to enumerate a "best" solution to C2
needs. However, through an illustration of the trade-offs involved in differing approaches
to solving parts of the system, it may be possible to choose a better system than if no
analysis were performed. Because the initial assumptions or conditions have such a great
impact upon the direction the system planning will take, it is helpful to review some of
the current high level guidance.
1. Joint Publication 1
If planners are to design systems to perform in a wartime environment, they
must know what the expected environment will be. However, inconsistencies exist
between high-level documents, and even within documents. Joint Publication 1 states:
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...the arena of our potential operations is the entire planet, with its surrounding
aerospace, from the ocean depths to geosynchronous orbit and beyond. We must
be prepared to defend our national interests in every type of terrain and state of sea
and air, from jungles, deserts, and tropical seas to polar ice caps. The US Armed
Forces face the challenge of mastering multifaceted conditions, unlike nations
whose military forces can concentrate on a more limited range of environments.
Indeed, the ability to project and sustain the entire range of military power over vast
distances is a basic requirement for the US Armed Forces and contributes, day in
and day out, to the maintenance of stability and deterrence worldwide. [Ref. 25:p.
2]
In contrast, the planning emphasis appears to be shifting toward the crisis and
limited objective warfare (CALOW) environment in the Copernicus architectural
document, as shown in Figure 18. As will be seen next, the C2 Functional Analysis and
Consolidation Review Panel (FACRP) states we should plan for general nuclear war and
focus attention on the CALOW environment. Any system designed without a clear
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Figure 18: Operational Continuum (1990-Beyond) [Ref. 26:p. 2-4]
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2. FACRP
With a goal of finding more efficient ways to meet the mission, the FACRP
reviewed national strategy and policy to assess C2 operational requirements in support of
the National Command Authorities (NCA) and Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Their
purpose was to "...identify cost-effective approaches to satisfying DoD-wide C2
requirements, specifically through consolidation of capabilities where such action makes
operational and economic sense." [Ref. 27 :p. 2] The FACRP went on to list the economic
and strategy changes, and the C2 drivers which will shape and impact future architectures.
These lists are shown in Tables 5 and 6. They also found that the current DoD C2
structure would not provide the long-term efficiencies needed, and suggested a new C2
structure would have the features below:
• A consolidated, DoD-wide, global C2 infrastructure
• A greater emphasis on joint task forces as the principle tactical operational forces
• Centrally managed operational support [Ref. 27 :p. 13]
Even though much of the above information is consistent with the findings
from the studies reviewed in Chapter II, consistency of policy or planning guidance is still
a problem.
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TABLE 5: ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGY CHANGES [Ref 27:p. 3]
Resource Availability
- US budget constraints
- Decreasing motivation to fund at Cold War levels
- Decreasing defense funding advocacy among major allies
The Soviet Threat
- Continuing, improving strategic forces
- Reduced conventional threat to Europe, reduced power projection capability
- Soviet political uncertainties
The Increased Regional Threat(s)
- Political and economic power shifts
- Insurgency, drugs, terrorism problems
- Availability, use of advanced weapons, including weapons of mass
destruction
Strategy Changes, Force Posture
- Forward presence, but with reduced forces at fewer overseas bases
- Backed up by CONUS contingency and reserve forces
- Planned mobilization, if needed
Technology Advances
- High-lethality weapons (e.g., precision guided, chemical, biological)
- High-capability weapon delivery (missile and airborne) systems
- Increased use of space
- New information transmission, processing, support capabilities
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TABLE 6: C2 DRIVERS [Ref 27:p 7]
Streamlining and Consolidating
- Reduce C2 personnel
- Consolidate U & S organization elements
- Eliminate redundant systems where possible
Risk Management and Acceptance
- Maintain deterrence, prepare for nuclear war
- Determine size, nature, and location of forces
- Determine minimum essential capabilities
- Standby contingency capabilities
- Mobilize if necessary
Strategic Agility
- Focus on low end of the conflict spectrum
- Deter, fight regional powers if necessary
- Support forward-deployed forces
- Support rapid deployment and redeployment
- Interact and interoperate with allies
Force C2 Interoperability
- Technical standards and protocols
- Applications: processing, interpretation
- Procedures
- Command response, common understanding
Force and C2 Modularity
- Joint and combined interoperability
- Relocatable/mobile modular assets





- New sensing and reporting systems
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3. The Next Step
As stated earlier, because the initial assumptions or conditions have such a
great impact on the direction system planning takes, they should be clear and consistent.
This forms the basis of the "givens" from which future trade-off analysis can occur.
C. PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Chapter II reviewed three studies which laid out a general direction of smaller,
lighter, more modular and interoperable equipment as goals for any new deployable TBM
equipment the USAF might purchase. In addition, 0*1 for the Warrior mentions a goal
architecture where all systems are connected to an ether. While either concept is not hard
to visualize as a possibility in its end form, no roadmap exists to join what is currently
in the inventories with the goal architectures. Many factors may make it difficult, but not
impossible, to realize these goals. The resolution of the areas explored below are
considered essential by the author for a cohesive deployable architecture to emerge.
1. Type of Conflict
It is not clear from policy exactly what type of warfare the military services
should realistically prepare for. The conflict spectrum presented from Copernicus implies
a planning shift, as does the FACRP. Planning should be consistent with the probability
of occurrence, but must also factor in the "cost" of being unprepared, even for some
unlikely event. Since the needs of each type of event will be different, the broader the




Modularity affords greater flexibility in terms of response and capability sizing
at the initial stages of a deployment. These modules should be compact and able to be
configured to meet the needs of a contingency force. Over time, however, if the network
becomes large, the advantages of the modules could diminish (due to economies of scale)
but could still be viable if the network is somewhat dynamic.
How modular to be is also a question, since many functions will still require
specialized equipment. For example, a telephone switch and a radar are very different
functions and would likely require different classes of equipment. The family of modules
as well as what is expected of them must be considered carefully.
3. Statement of Requirements
Before a communications structure can be developed, requirements must be
determined. As a result of post-Desert Storm tasking, the USAF (as well as JDEO and
other organizations) have drafted architectures which now serve as the design model for
developing the supporting communications structure [Ref. 28]. These architectures are
helpful in showing which activities are coupled and which are not, but do not show the
relative capacity that would be required between entities.
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4. Sizing Requirements
The capacity requirements of the links that connect the various entities, as well
as the direction of flow (A to B, B to A, or both) are needed to properly size the network.
The USAFTC study had this to say about sizing:
While communications connectivity requirements are understood (i.e., who needs
to talk to whom) the expected utilization or circuit loading is not well characterized.
Without this data, the degree to which circuits can be shared in a demand
assignment or packet switching environment cannot be assessed. [Ref. 4:p. 9]
To illustrate this, the Air Force Communications Command's Standard Systems
Center eventually provided a deployed data network (in support of Desert Storm) capable
of handling in excess of 200,000 supply and maintenance transactions from 50 sites each
day—linked back to a host computer at Langley AFB,VA by commercial satellite links at
over 3 million bits per second (MBPS). But the planning for this network did not get off
the ground until the first planes were on their way to Saudi Arabia. While the concepts
had been explored earlier, testing was being accomplished to validate it during the build-
up of forces. Even after the network was installed and became operational, it continued
to grow as demands increased. [Ref. 29:p. 58] This situation is likely to be the norm in
the future, especially as data networks are increasingly used to support the warfighters.
Understanding what needs to flow between entities will help quantify the size
of the links needed. Not all information needs to go in every direction. Copernicus uses
the ideas of "push-pull" to show this. "Push" could be information which is broadcast
from a central source (such as intelligence information from national assets), while "pull"
would be queries or requests made for information from a central database. In the "pull"
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mode, the user only draws in the information of immediate interest. [Ref. 26:p. 2-8] Of
course, actually determining the size of these links will be dependent upon the service
increment chosen as the basic building block. This is one of the roles that standards play.
5. Standards
Standards provide a common reference point for determining required capacity
of service (how many channels of a given size), and they define the technical parameters
that equipment must conform to in order to connect to the network. While deployable
systems use a digital channel based upon a 16 or 32 kilobit per second (KBPS) rate and
the continuously variable sloped delta (CVSD) voice modulation scheme [Ref. 16:p. 19],
modern fixed systems use a 64 KBPS rate and the pulse code modulation scheme,
commonly called a DS-0 channel. The DS-0 channel is part of the larger North American
Multiplexing Scheme which includes DS-1 and DS-3 (also referred to as T-l and T-3) at
1.544 and 44.736 MBPS. [Ref. 30:p. 39] Adopting these standards would ease the
strategic/tactical interface problem highlighted in Chapter IV, and allow the use of modem
and highly reliable commercial equipment. This would also afford deployed users the
same level of service they now enjoy in-garrison. In fact, T-l service to the customer
premises is now common, and T-3 services are appearing rapidly as more tariffs are
approved [Ref. 31:p. 82]. The down side is an initial investment in new equipment, but
this has in recent years become relatively inexpensive as commercial standards and
technology have outpaced military ones.
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6. Transportation and Phasing of Equipment
More modular equipment should be easier to move (less air cargo space
required) at the onset of hostilities since only the required capabilities need to be sent.
Recall from Chapter II that the initial emphasis for Desert Storm was on getting firepower
into theater, not necessarily support equipment. Under the current methods,
communications support for an airwing is provided from organizations outside the wing.
While this works well for sustainment, it is not responsive to rapid deployment needs or
contingencies. As such, Tactical Air Command (TAC) is exploring a wing-integral
communications concept that will deploy with the wing and provide all essential
communications for the first two weeks. After that, the sustaining equipment and
personnel would assume the communications functions. [Ref. 29:p. 57]
While this approach could help alleviate some of the phasing problems that
arose during Desert Storm, new issues are brought forth. If different people and
equipment will be responsible for the same support, but at different times, how will the
handoff be accomplished? If the initial package becomes part of the sustaining force, it
must be interoperable and compatible with it. Modular design would help ensure the
follow on forces would be able to add to the capability gracefully. If equipment will be
"swapped out," the network must be designed in such a way as to ensure an orderly
transition with little or no outage time.
7. Dispersal and Distributed Processing
Dispersal and distributed processing appears as a goal in many architectural
documents (recall TC2-21 and the Air Force C-CS Architecture, for example). This
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concept spreads equipment and personnel over a greater geographic region to provide a
high degree of physical protection to both. Embedded in this concept is a very high
degree of interoperability and conformance to standards. Demands on the network
infrastructure would increase since each dispersed location must have a connection into
the network. But it may be possible to reduce or eliminate some of the transportation
requirements through pre-positioning. In a position paper on tactical C3I architectures in
support of Global Reach, Captain Duncan McKenzie advocates the construction of three
Global Reach ground entry stations; one on each coast of the United States, and one
within the footprint of the Indian Ocean satellite [Ref. 32:p. 1]. McKenzie's premise is
that these ground stations could handle the "hubbing" function normally assigned to
theater assets, so that the equipment actually deployed could be in direct support of a
wing [Ref. 32:p. 7].
This is a departure from a traditional hierarchical approach to C2 , which he
says works well for ground forces, but not for air forces (as they found out during Desert
Storm). He attributes this to differences for ground and air forces in their C2, intelligence,
and logistics relationships. [Ref. 32:p. 2] Where ground forces are very hierarchical in
structure, air forces tend to be more horizontal (at least for the support functions—the C2
functions performed by the TACC would still remain hierarchical to retain centralized
control). Wings deploy to a tactical air base, but get nearly all their support from outside
the theater. McKenzie points out that only two C2 circuits originate inside the theater,
scramble (used to "scramble" alert aircraft toward targets) and CAFMS (computer assisted
force management system, used to disseminate the ATO). Supply and maintenance
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functions are remoted from U.S. bases, and intelligence and weather go direct to the wing
via national sources. [Ref. 32:p. 3] He further asks: "Since the above services require
little or no intervention by higher echelons within a theater, why not adopt a tactical
network architecture that simultaneously provides intra-theater C2 connectivity and direct
inter-theater connectivity between deployed air forces and their CONUS based sources?"
[Ref. 32:p. 4] His concept would be to provide the ground stations with connections to
networks for national information, trunks to other ground stations for inter-theater
capabilities, and switching facilities for intra-theater needs. A user would reach the
ground station by satellite, and would be patched to the path their needs dictate. Figure
19 shows an example layout for a ground station. Note that users can be patched direct
to another user (a dedicated path), or switched, and can be routed within the theater, or
into any of the global networks that the ground station can access.
D. SUMMARY
There are a great many issues which must be considered if an integrated approach
to providing deployable communications is to be taken. In some ways, the way in which
the services are being provided is evolving faster that the present structure can
accommodate. Some issues focus on the technical aspects of getting equipment to talk
to and understand each other, while others are more related to planning considerations,
while others still examine the more fundamental question of how services will be
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Figure 19: Example Global Reach Ground Station [Ref. 32:p. 11]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
There has been a great deal of effort at many levels to get a handle on the problems
that face deployable systems. These efforts should be acknowledged for their attempts
to quantify the problems and develop solutions prior to any of this author's own
recommendations. Specifically, the studies reviewed, the after-action reports that followed
Desert Storm, C*I for the Warrior, and the Functional Analysis Consolidation Review
Panel (FACRP) all demonstrate that the technical problems are reasonably well
understood and are solvable. The people behind these efforts are doing their best to take
a very complex situation, one which crosses many functional boundaries, and meld it into
a synthesized, cohesive whole. Their work has paved the way for better communications
support for the warriors in the future.
Defining the goal and reaching it can be two different things, however. Where it
appears the technical solutions are within reach, the mechanisms to implement those
solutions may be cumbersome, or worse yet, non-existent. Integrated problem solving
should include not only the technical solutions but also the addressing of the means to
implement those solutions. The recommendations below serve as a starting point for
getting some of these areas identified, and ultimately solved.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Assignment of Responsibility and Authority
Assignment of responsibility and authority has yet to be vested in a single
focal point. The TBM study called for the creation of a "center of excellence" where
architectural and technical expertise, as well as information on the TBM activities of other
services, could be centrally located. [Ref. 3:p. 5] Although a General Officer Steering
Group (GOSG) and working group have been established for TBM activities, these groups
meet only periodically to resolve issues of concern and to set broad policy. Their charter
is included as an Appendix for information purposes.
It is possible that the GOSG could act as a "board of directors" in guiding the TBM
activities for the Air Force. However, it is not clear who the members of the
"communications corporation" really are, what their responsibilities would be, and what
the relationships between them would be. Following the lead set by DISA, focal points
should be established for areas under the TBM umbrella. All of these would then report
back to the TBM architect who would ensure overall harmony of effort. The TBM
architect should also act as the Air Force focal point for joint activities regarding
deployable communications.
Without a center of excellence to guide and shape the efforts of many
agencies, the Air Force lacks the integration needed to ensure the findings of the studies
are resolved. Research for this thesis revealed that many entities are developing
independent architectures outside any broad umbrella structure which might require them
to fit within [Ref. 33:p. 1]. On the bright side, actions are being taken by the new
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architecture and integration division of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to eliminate duplication of effort and get control of greater than 300 architectures
[Ref. 34:p. 1].
Where to place such a center and how to staff it are tough issues. Since the
best operational perspective comes from people immersed in the operational environment,
it may be possible to distribute the "center" geographically to gain expertise, while a core
group would be responsible for the day-to-day management of affairs. The core group
would manage the databases and coordination with other services and DoD agencies, and
the designated, distributed focal points would be consulted and kept apprised through
messages. For this system to work would require commitment on the part of the
distributed representatives, and significant dialogue between them and the core group.
The core group could be co-located with the Technology Integration Center, but to have
any power, it must have the backing of Headquarters and the major commands
(MAJCOM's) to carry out its mission. The expertise is available; it merely needs to be
assembled and oriented toward the goal.
2. Follow-up Mechanism
Possibly at the heart of the above problems is the lack of any institutionalized
follow-up procedures. The studies did not carry any directive authority to implement their
recommendations, and the AFSB does not track the status of a study once completed [Ref.
35]. Nor does the sponsor, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), have a means yet to
determine the status of corrective actions taken. Although measures are being
implemented informally at AFSC, follow-up action will still be sporadic for some time
73
to come. [Ref. 36] One responsibility of the TBM architect should be to gauge progress
of the current system relative to the goals set forth from sanctioned studies.
3. Providing the Tools
a. Policy
Above all, clear policy is needed to guide the thinking of systems
architects and engineers. The USAF's Global Reach, Global Power concept, where we
desire the ability to respond quickly to any contingency, at any point on the earth, helps
frame the problems to be solved. But this broad goal will be difficult to reach without
breaking it into smaller pieces. It is still possible to respond to the challenges with a
balanced suite of capabilities, where elements of the suite can be individually tailored to
an appropriate mission. Policy should help determine the level of resources to use in
realizing each element (based upon the threat and its probability of occurrence).
b. Models
Modelling and computer simulations can be valuable tools when
resources are tight and risks are high. They allow many options to be examined without
ever having to build a physical system. But to build these models and simulations
requires good input data if reasonable results are to be expected. The Air Force has very
little quantitative knowledge on network loading under stress [Ref. 4:p. 8]. Traffic
analysis records from Desert Storm should prove helpful in developing realistic models
for wartime communications requirements. However, caution should be exercised since
the requirements may not be representative or scalable to other situations. An
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understanding of the model will be critical to allow its evolution and growth as
requirements and future needs dictate. This understanding will hopefully enable
successful alterations, and provide greater confidence in the results of "what-if" analysis.
These models would also be able to assist in trade-off analysis to highlight performance
under various scenarios for the alternatives under study.
c. Trade-off Analysis
Within broad guidelines, many different architectures or systems would
be equally capable of providing suitable service. While this is understood and exploited
in weapon systems design, it seems to be a relatively new concept to tactical C2 or TBM.
A report by the E-Systems Corporation, conducted for the Electronics Systems Division
of AFSC did attempt to determine the relative merits of a fully centralized versus fully
distributed TBM approach [Ref. 38:p. 5]. This was an extension of the TC2-21 study,
where the architectures were more fully developed and analyzed.
d. Artificial Intelligence
Expert systems and artificial intelligence can be used as database
management and information decision tools. Recalling the concepts of push and pull of
information, rule sets can be established to automatically route information to a
commander. The rule set can be established in advance, and information placed into the
ether can be tested against the rules. A simple example would be the use of key words,
similar to the way information is cataloged for libraries. If the conditions specified are
met, the information is sent to the commander. Otherwise, the information can be stored
for possible later retrieval. In this way, the commander can pre-filter incoming
information so that only the information of interest actually arrives at his desk.
4. Conceptual Clarity
A recurring theme throughout this research has been a sense of confusion over
how the different pieces of the puzzle fit together: the relationship between master plans
and architectures, the relationships between different architectures (technical, functional,
or those in support of a specific CINC or major command), and the relationships between
architectures of different services. Logically, there should be a natural nesting of
architectures from one level to the next. At the risk of over-simplification, Figure 20
shows how service architectures could be pieced together to form a CINC architecture.
Further, using the Air Force segment, MAJCOM architectures can be joined to form the
service architecture. The functional areas are represented as ellipses; they span the entire
theater, and are represented within each service/MAJCOM architecture as well.
Sub-architectures can taken down to the desired level of detail, with the caveat
that connections to other parts of the parent architecture remain clear. In a sense, the sub-
architectures would be modules that plug into the parent architecture. Sub-architectures
would also be cascaded to ultimately form the support structure required by the CINC.
Interoperability should be treated as an issue within an architecture, not as an
architecture itself. Interoperability between systems is a design goal that can be served
through clear architectural concepts. Interoperability concerns occur wherever a boundary
is crossed. This could be between functional areas, services, or commands. Defining the
standards at the boundaries, and enforcing compliance ensures systems will interoperate.
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Figure 20: Architectural Concepts
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A factor that compounds these conceptual problems is that the word
"architecture" does not have a universal meaning within the DoD. JCS Pub 1-02 does not
have an entry for architectures, and dictionaries are not always consistent with each other.
This has led to many different interpretations of the word and corresponding confusion
over what should be in an architectural document. [Ref. 38:pp. 2-3] A proposed
definition is:
A guide or "blueprint" which outlines the shape and structure of a system, or group
of systems. It provides a goal to build toward, and shows the boundaries between
systems and the standards used at the boundaries.
The essential elements are structure and standards. It should be clear to
anyone reading an architectural document what would be required for them to interface
with it.
5. Systems Training
Part of the difficulties facing deployable systems may stem from a lack of
training in "systems" themselves. As stated in Chapter I, systems are more than just the
sum of their parts, and are characterized by interdependence of elements. Engineers and
technicians need to understand the individual pieces of equipment, but maybe even more
important is an understanding of how that piece of equipment contributes to the overall
network, and the impact to the network if that equipment is dysfunctional. This is
especially important since, as they progress in their careers, these same people will be
responsible for designing and implementing new families of equipment.
78
C. THE MISSING LINK
Integrating deployable communications systems will not be easy; otherwise the
problem would have been solved by now. But from a systems standpoint, it appears that
many of the problems are more organizational in nature than technical. Fundamentally,
this means that the physical system can only be as integrated as the management and
organizational infrastructure behind it. Where concepts are not well understood or
executed in organizations, it will be difficult to design these concepts into a physical
system; the finished product will mirror the strengths and weaknesses of its design.
While solving the small problems is important, the task still remains to ensure that all the
solutions are integrated and that the total product produces the desired system
performance.
In the goal architectures, the Air Force has asked deployable communications
systems to perform things which have not yet been solved for the fixed systems-
compatible data formats, for example. If the organizational and management issues
behind data formats remain unresolved, the best of equipment will not solve the problem.
Simply providing a personal computer to Oscar Madison (of the "Odd Couple") will not,
in itself, make him an organized person.
If this thesis can leave the reader with a better appreciation for the underlying
causes of persistent integration problems with deployable communications then its goal
has been reached. Possibly the single most important concept could be that the way
systems are fielded is just as critical as the system itself. Study after study can determine
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where technical problems lie and recommend solutions, but without a coherent mechanism
to implement to solutions, the best plans will never be fully realized.
D. SUMMARY
The technical problems facing deployable communications systems today are fairly
well characterized and understood. The solutions lie in developing interfaces to allow
existing equipment to interoperate, while at the same time reaching toward a goal of
greater use of common standards, open systems, modular equipment, and distributed
processing. But if the goal of integrated systems is to be reached, the management
structure which spawns the system must itself become integrated. This author is




GENERAL OFFICER STEERING GROUP/WORKING GROUP
CHARTER
1. PURPOSE: This Charter defines the membership of the Theater Battle Management
(TBM) General Officer Steering Group (GOSG) and its subordinate TBM Working Group
(WG).
2. SCOPE: Theater Battle Management is broadly defined as that function of AF
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) which supports the rapid
acquisition and reliable processing, correlation, and dissemination of information required
for decision making in support of theater operations at all levels from command battle
management to the mission planning and execution levels. TBM is focused on
automation of processes, integration of systems, and interoperability of hardware,
software, and procedures which directly or indirectly affect the speed and efficiency of
tactical and strategic force execution. The program will orchestrate the fielding of
selected C3I projects through rapid prototyping, evolutionary acquisition, and continuous
user-developer interaction. The TBM C3I goal is to improve our warfighting ability
through (1) accelerating information flow to the commanders, (2) providing more timely
information for decisions, (3) providing better decision support, and (4) decreasing the
tasking-to-execution-to-retasking cycle times.
3. ORGANIZATION: The GOSG is supported by the TBM WG, which provides a
forum for: (1) working issues assigned by the GOSG, (2) developing recommendations
for inclusion of selected efforts within the TBM program, (3) providing activity reports
to each GOSG meeting, and (4) exchanging information. Neither the GOSG nor the WG
is intended to supplant existing staff organizations/groups dedicated to resolving TBM
problems, but rather to provide cross functional guidance and policy.
a. GOSG membership is comprised of AF customers (TAC/DO, PACAF/DO,
MAC/XO, AFSOC/CV, AFIC/CV, and AFSPACECOM/DO), requirements developers
(TAC/DR, MAC/XR, SAC/XR), and suppliers (AFSC/XR, AFCC/CC, ESD/CV, and
SSC/CC). The chairman is TAC/DR. Other agencies are asked to participate and provide
expertise in areas of interest to the AF and include representatives from the
MAJCOM/IN/SC/XP, SAF/AQP, AF/XO/IN/SC, and the suppliers/laboratories such as
ASD, ESD, Rome and Armstrong Labs, and the TIC. The Secretariat is TAC/DRI.
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TAC/SCP serves as technical advisor to the Secretariat. Responsibilities for day-to-day
decision making will be delegated to the TBM WG.
b. The General Officer Steering Group will:
(1) Serve as the governing body to set policy for the theater operators on
procedures, terminology, direction and scope of TBM activities and establish priorities for
requirements.
(2) Provide direction, guidance, and support for TBM initiatives and C3I
automation efforts.
(3) Establish focal points for resolution of problems/issues regarding TBM
systems' requirements, funding, development, fielding, and the connectivity between other
systems.
(4) Serve as the sponsoring group for the TBM WG.
(5) Confirm decisions of the TBM WG.
(6) Meet twice a year (or as required).
c. Associate (ex officio) membership will be extended to the Army, Navy, and
Marines. Their participation will be as observers/advisors as required.
d. The TBM Working Group membership is comprised of customer representatives
from appropriate TAC, PACAF, USAFE, MAC, SAC, AFSOC, AFIC, and
AFSPACECOM program offices (both functional and technical), interested air staff
(SAF/AQP/ACT, AF/XOO/XOR/INX/SCM), suppliers (AFSC, AFCC, AFCSC, ASD,
AWS, DMA, ESD, SSC, Rome and Armstrong Labs), and joint services (equivalent
user/developer-level representation). As with the GOSG, TAC/DRI is the Secretariat.
The group may establish one or more subgroups tailored to address specific
programs/issues assigned.
e. The Working Group will:
(1) Work issues assigned by the GOSG.
(2) Review, prioritize, and approve TBM needs.
(3) Monitor TBM programs under development.
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(4) Oversee TBM laboratory/testbed developments.
(5) Review advanced TBM technology and command-unique TBM programs
for AF applicability and recommend candidates for rapid prototyping considerations.
(6) Define specific TBM interoperability issues and propose solutions.
(7) Confirm decisions of subordinate working groups.




















Airborne Command and Control Center
Air Component Commander
Air Force
Airborne Forward Air Controller
Air Force Communications Command
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Air Force Component Headquarters
Air Force Cryptologic Security Center
Air Force Intelligence Command
Air Force Systems Command
Air Force Special Operations Command
Air Force Space Command
Aeronautical Systems Division
Air Support Operations Center
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Command, Control, and Communications
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Computer Assisted Force Management System




Control and Reporting Center
Control and Reporting Post
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Contingency TACS Automated Planning System








Deployable Communications-Computer Systems Architecture
Digital Group Multiplexing equipment








Forward Air Control Post
Functional Analysis and Consolidation Review Panel
Forward Line of Troops
GOSG
GMFSC
General Officer Steering Group
Ground Mobile Forces Satellite Communications




Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Interoperability Test Center
Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System
KBPS Kilobits per second
MAC Military Airlift Command
MAJCOM Major Command
MBPS Megabits per second
MCE Modular Control Element
MOB Main Operating Base
MPC Message Processing Center
MTACC Modular Tactical Air Control Center
MTI Moving Target Indicator
NCA National Command Authorities
NTB National Test Bed
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAF Secretary of the Air Force
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SHF Super High Frequency
SSC Standard Systems Center
TAB Tactical Air Base
TAC Tactical Air Command










Tactical Air Control System
Tactical Air Control Party
Tactical Data Link
Theater Battle Management
21st Century Tactical Command and Control
Technology Integration Center





United States Air Force
United States Air Forces Europe
United States Air Force Tactical Communications
woe Wing Operations Center
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